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BOOK REVIEWS
IS chIna’S fOREIgn pOlIcy dRIVEn By pERcEptIOnS Of  
VulnERaBIlIty? 
Nathan, Andrew J., and Andrew Scobell. China’s Search for Security. New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 2012. 406pp. $32.95
The nation’s “rebalance” to Asia has 
been greeted by a plethora of new books 
on Asia-Pacific security issues. In con-
trast to the many worthwhile specialist 
works now available, China’s Search for 
Security stands out as an ambitious at-
tempt to offer a one-volume overview  
of China’s security situation as seen 
from the Chinese point of view. Both 
authors are established and respected 
scholars. Andrew Nathan is best known 
as an editor of the Tiananmen Papers  
(PublicAffairs, 2002), while Andrew 
Scobell is author of the well-regarded 
China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond  
the Great Wall and the Long March 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
This work began as a revision of their 
1997 collaboration The Great Wall 
and the Empty Fortress, but the rapid 
changes in the Asian security land-
scape in the last decade have made 
China’s Search for Security essentially a  
completely new volume. 
The authors begin by asking what drives 
Chinese foreign policy and who makes 
decisions in the Chinese system. Their 
clear, cogent explanation of the state, 
party, security, and intelligence elements 
that constitute the Chinese foreign 
policy–making elite is exceptional and 
is perhaps the best part of the book. The 
authors conclude that a small elite group 
still has the ability to “sustain strategic 
policies in a disciplined way over long 
periods of time.” While arguably better 
informed and more constrained by other 
elements of society than in the past, the 
elite remains largely isolated, with the 
risk that it will make major mistakes or 
fail to adapt to changing circumstances.
Scobell and Nathan contend that Chi-
nese foreign policy is driven primarily 
by perceptions of vulnerability. Chi-
nese elites see the world as “a terrain 
of hazards” comprising four interlock-
ing circles of threats: territory China 
administers or claims; border states, 
which include the United States as a 
Pacific power; six nearby multistate re-
gional systems; and the rest of the world. 
Within this construct, the authors do an 
admirable job of presenting the history 
of China’s relations with each of its key 
neighbors. Scobell and Nathan sug-
gest that China engages the fourth ring 
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(comprising three-quarters of the world) 
only to serve specific interests. Though 
those interests are expanding, most 
of the finite attention Chinese leaders 
give to international issues focuses on 
challenges within and near its borders.
Presenting China’s obsession with its 
territorial integrity, Scobell and Na-
than explain Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan in a sophisticated 
and integrated overall context. They 
conclude that China is not expansionist 
but rather unyielding within its identi-
fied historical claims. By focusing on 
these four core geographic areas and 
relegating discussion of the South China 
Sea and the Senkaku Islands to chap-
ters on China’s relations with Japan and 
Southeast Asia, however, the authors 
understate the sometimes elastic nature 
of Chinese claims. In this context, the 
authors’ focus on elite political decision 
making arguably underrepresents the 
growing impact of popular national-
ism on high-profile sovereignty issues. 
Nationalism, they concede, is “the only 
important value still shared by the 
regime and its critics” in Chinese society. 
Finally, Scobell and Nathan present the 
instruments of Chinese power, focus-
ing a chapter each on the economic, 
military, and “soft power” tools at the 
disposal of the Chinese Communist 
Party. They conclude by offering three 
possible trajectories for Chinese devel-
opment: economic success and au-
thoritarianism (the “Singapore model”), 
political democratization, and regime 
failure. The authors do not betray which 
of these outcomes they view as most 
likely. Consistent with their presenta-
tion of the Chinese point of view, they 
conclude that China no more knows 
its own future than does anyone else. 
reducing a topic this complex into 
one volume is inherently an exercise in 
intellectual triage, and some topics are 
naturally underrepresented. Issues of  
cyber warfare, the Internet, and the 
political impact of new media are 
touched on, but their full complexities 
as mechanisms of Chinese soft power, 
potential threats to regime stability, or 
means of economic espionage are not 
fully explored. Consideration of People’s 
liberation Army capabilities, while 
deftly crafted, comprises less than forty 
pages. The Chinese navy’s three years 
of sustained operations in the gulf of 
Aden are mentioned only in passing. 
readers interested in details of Chinese 
military capabilities and institutions will 
want to consult more specialized texts. 
With this limited caveat, China’s Search 
for Security is the best one-volume 
introduction to Chinese security issues 
in print. At once rigorous and read-
able, it offers U.S. Navy officers headed 
to the Pacific a chance to consider 
the region through a Chinese lens. 
Specialist readers may disagree with 
specific points of interpretation but 
will be impressed by the scope of the 
survey and the synthesis presented. 
CommANder dAle C. rIelAge, USN
Crist, david. The Twilight War: The Secret History 
of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran. New 
York: Penguin, 2012. 638pp. $22
Author david Crist writes, “Conspiracy 
theories abound in the middle east in 
part because there frequently are so 
many conspiracies.” every chapter of 
The Twilight War pulls back the curtain 
and sheds new light on many previously 
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undisclosed and often underappreciated 
events that have shaped U.S.-Iranian 
relations. This masterfully researched 
historical account focuses on U.S.- 
Iranian relations since the fall of the 
shah of Iran and the beginning of the 
Iranian revolution. The policy and strat-
egy decisions of the past six U.S. presi-
dents, covert CIA operations, Iranian 
actions and reactions, and the struggle 
to create the present-day U.S. Central 
Command are all detailed in this book. 
david Crist works as a historian for the 
federal government and as a frequent 
adviser to senior government and 
military officials. He is also a colonel in 
the marine Corps reserve and a veteran 
of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. His 
research for this work included inter-
views and access to records of many 
of the principal decision makers on 
both sides. The Twilight War comes 
at a critical time in the relationship 
between the United States and Iran. 
If plotted on a graph, the thirty-year 
chronology of events between the United 
States and Iran would look like two op-
posing synchronized sine waves: when 
one is up, the other is down, and never 
the two shall meet. Crist’s engaging 
account provides never-before-revealed 
insights into the near, and often missed, 
opportunities for reconciliation between 
both countries. In what could sometimes 
pass for a Sophoclean tragedy, if not 
for the very real consequences, these 
two opposing nations cannot seem to 
get in step long enough to find ways 
to resolve their standing grievances. 
Some readers may criticize Crist’s lack 
of detail on the complex history of 
Iran during the reign of the American-
supported shah. Crist explains his 
decision to pick up the story of U.S.-
Iranian relations at the time of the 
Iranian revolution on the grounds that 
these are the years of direct conflict and 
competition with Iran. It is clear that 
this decision allows for a more focused 
examination of the current regime, as 
well as the events that are currently 
shaping our world. Those interested in 
prerevolutionary U.S.-Iranian relations 
may wish to read Stephen Kinzer’s All 
the Shah’s Men (Wiley Press, 2008). 
general James mattis has made The Twi-
light War required reading for members 
of the U.S. Central Command staff. This 
insightful and intellectually provoca-
tive book should be required reading 
in fact for all military professionals 
who wish to gain a better understand-
ing of what many in the profession of 
arms consider the most likely reason for 
military conflict in the next decade. 
dANIel dolAN
Naval War College
Smith, Jean edward. Eisenhower: In War and 
Peace. New York: random House, 2012. 951pp. 
$40
When you mention dwight david 
“Ike” eisenhower, far too many people 
will hark back either to d-day and the 
invasion of Normandy or to a mythical, 
almost lyrical presidency, when life was 
good, three martinis accompanied every 
lunch, and gas cost pennies a gallon. 
The truth, of course, is far different and 
far more interesting. In Eisenhower Jean 
edward Smith has produced what may 
well be the best one-volume biography 
on this figure. The book moves fast 
and yet manages to leave nothing out.
In illuminating dwight d. eisenhower, 
Smith steps adroitly and rapidly through 
the years of his life, maintaining the 
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reader’s interest and never shortchanging 
his subject. It is a bravura performance. 
For example, Smith moves through 
eisenhower’s childhood at a gallop, 
while fully describing a family that was 
centered on a domineering, distant, and 
hot-tempered father but made bearable 
by the love and efforts of his mother, Ida. 
eisenhower’s rise in the Army also 
speeds by, but not without explanation 
of the critical importance of Fox Conner,  
Ike’s steadfast mentor and advocate; 
george Patton, who became a trusted 
friend and fellow missionary of armored 
warfare; and douglas macArthur, who 
both recognized and used eisenhower’s 
talents in Washington, d.C., and in the 
Philippines. Ike’s rise to prominence in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s as an ex-
ceptional staff officer is well chronicled, 
as is his progressively improving ability 
to lead combined forces, once given 
major command in North Africa and 
europe. Almost before the reader knows 
it, eisenhower has invaded europe, ar-
ranged for the liberation of Paris, been 
surprised by the germans in the Battle 
of the Bulge, and terminated the war. 
He then becomes the first commander 
of NATo and the chancellor of Colum-
bia University. Ike’s campaign and two 
terms in the White House flow by at an 
equally fast pace, leading to his retire-
ment from office and a final move to 
the farm at gettysburg, Pennsylvania. 
Ike’s transition from military leader to po-
litical candidate to president is as surely 
and speedily dealt with. Smith lays out 
the major issues of the day and in so do-
ing reminds the reader that eisenhower,  
far from pursuing a presidency of golf 
and leisure, dealt with major domestic 
and international issues throughout his 
term in office. Ike was less than kind to 
richard Nixon, although readers may 
find it difficult to muster much sympa-
thy for the vice president. The two men 
were of vastly different temperaments 
and capabilities, and eisenhower made it 
clear he thought Nixon was not of presi-
dential caliber. However, part of  
eisenhower’s antipathy might have  
stemmed from the fact that Nixon, with  
the brilliant success of the Checkers  
speech, forced eisenhower to report 
earnings he would rather have kept private.
Smith awards eisenhower full points 
for the handling of the Suez crisis of 
1956. He depicts a world leader in his 
prime, a president who is savvy, decisive, 
and powerful. The reader is reminded 
that his stand on Suez was as much 
about principle as it was about power.
If, however, there is one portion of the 
book that truly stands out as the best 
part of an exceptional work, it is the 
recounting of how eisenhower handled 
Arkansas governor orval Faubus’s 
refusal to desegregate public schools as 
directed by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Brown v. Topeka. eisenhower 
the man, while in no way a racist by the 
standards of his day, was not one to chal-
lenge southern apartheid or other racial 
inequities. However, eisenhower the 
president was different. He had taken the 
oath of office, and the Supreme Court 
decision made clear where his duty lay. 
Faubus refused to fulfill his gubernato-
rial responsibility to provide order and 
safety, so Ike stepped in, federalizing the 
Arkansas National guard and ordering 
elements of the 101st Infantry divi-
sion to little rock. equally credible 
was the manner in which eisenhower 
refused to accept delays in desegregat-
ing the military, something for which 
he is routinely given too little credit.
In this excellent biography Smith 
also takes a major, and unfortunately 
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deserved, swipe at the late Stephen  
Ambrose. Ambrose, long accepted as a  
leading scholar on eisenhower, was 
found to be guilty of plagiarism in  
some of his later works; as Smith 
points out, Ambrose also fabricated 
accounts of meetings between himself 
and eisenhower, meetings that simply 
did not occur. The failure of Ambrose 
stands as a stark reminder as to the 
fallibility of historians and the need to 
get the history right. This Smith does. 
His scholarship is meticulous, and his 
book is a worthy addition to any shelf.
rICHArd NorToN 
Naval War College
Berman, larry. The Life and Times of Admiral 
Elmo Russell “Bud” Zumwalt, Jr. New York: 
HarperCollins, 2012. 528pp. $29.99
larry Berman has written a scintillating 
biography of the man who is credited 
with changing the U.S. Navy more, 
perhaps, than any other single individual 
in its history. Zumwalt was contro-
versial in his day, and Berman found 
during his research that feelings about 
the admiral, both positive and negative, 
still run strongly nearly forty years after 
his tour as Chief of Naval operations. 
His book, although clearly written from 
an advocate’s viewpoint, captures the 
essence of why Admiral Zumwalt was 
such a polemic figure during a time 
of great social and political turmoil, 
both inside and outside the Navy.
Berman crafts a comprehensive picture 
of a highly complex individual who was 
driven as much by his heart as by his 
keen intellect. Zumwalt’s strong social 
conscience enabled him to perceive 
what most did not—a navy that was 
fundamentally racist and sexist, a navy 
that inflicted innumerable injustices 
on its sailors under the assumption 
such practices were needed to ensure 
discipline among the rank and file. As 
Berman found, few of Zumwalt’s con-
temporaries were his intellectual equals, 
particularly when it came to understand-
ing the magnitude of the Soviet naval 
threat that confronted the United States 
in the 1970s. Berman makes clear that 
Zumwalt’s reward for attempting both to 
change the Navy’s force structure and to 
eliminate its abusive personnel policies 
was pushback by many of its most senior 
officers, who felt he was pushing too 
hard and going too fast. While Zumwalt 
saw a lack of accountable leadership, his 
critics saw a man hell-bent to destroy 
many of the Navy’s most cherished 
traditions. To most junior officers and 
junior enlisted he was a godsend, who, 
unlike most senior enlisted and older 
officers, understood the difficult condi-
tions under which they served. Berman 
paints a vivid picture of the social issues 
and grievances that were not simply 
demeaning to the young sailors who 
manned the Navy but also threatened 
the service’s ability to man its ships 
and squadrons once the all-volunteer 
force replaced the vietnam-era draft.
Berman also provides his readers with a 
riveting account of Admiral Zumwalt’s 
troubled relationships with President 
Nixon and National Security Adviser 
Henry Kissinger. Nixon held Zumwalt 
personally responsible for the race riots 
that broke out in three ships, blam-
ing him for allowing lax disciplinary 
standards that, in his view, had led to 
the problems. Kissinger is portrayed as 
a self-interested political scientist who 
was willing to put the nation’s secu-
rity at grave risk in order to achieve 
an ill-advised arms-reduction treaty.
5
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Berman has penned a compelling story 
of a man before his time and a book that 
sheds greater light on the diverse chal-
lenges that confronted Admiral Zumwalt 
during his tenure. Naval professionals in 
the twenty-first century will find many 
of the issues he attempted to rectify 
in the 1970s still unresolved today.
roNAld rATClIFF
Naval War College
Zanco, Jean-Philippe, ed. Dictionnaire des minis-
tres de la marine, 1689–1958. Collections Kronos. 
Paris: Éditions SPm, 2011. 564pp. €45
loge maritime de recherche la Pérouse (France). 
Dictionnaire des marins francs-maçons: Gens de 
mer et professions connexes aux XVIIIe, XIXe et 
XXe siècles. edited by Jean-marc van Hille. Col-
lections Kronos. Paris: Éditions SPm, 2011. 
571pp. €46.50
Jean-Philippe Zanco’s biographical 
dictionary of French naval ministers 
provides an extremely useful and handy 
overview and guide to the history of 
French naval administration over a 
period of 269 years. The first forty 
pages provide a broad and authoritative 
overview of the history of French naval 
administration, a survey that includes 
the background for the earlier period 
from richelieu to Colbert’s initiatives 
under louis XIv. This overview offers 
organizational charts that trace the 
transmission of naval and maritime 
affairs over the broad periods of French 
governmental history, as well as a 
chronological list of all ministers who 
served between 1626 and 1958. The fol-
lowing four hundred pages of the book 
are devoted to biographical sketches of 
all ministers who served between 1689 
and 1958, listed in alphabetical order 
and written by twenty-six different 
contributors. About a page and a half is 
devoted to each individual who served 
the French government as minister of 
the navy, secretary of state for the navy, 
undersecretary of state for the navy, or 
secretary of state for the merchant ma-
rine. each biographical sketch includes a 
short summary about the person’s term 
of office as a naval minister, as well as 
other aspects of his life and career, and 
a portrait, where known, all followed by 
a list of the key archival and short refer-
ences to the published sources about 
each individual. The short references are 
linked to full bibliographical references 
at the end of the volume, where one can 
also find an index to all personal names. 
The book is particularly useful, in all 
periods, for its gathering of archival 
references to personal papers. For 
the periods of the Third and Fourth 
republics, it is an enormous help to 
sorting out the frequent change in 
ministries, which sometimes lasted 
only days or months. Zanco’s Diction-
naire des ministres de la marine is an 
essential guide for anyone approach-
ing the administrative history of the 
French navy for the first time, as well as 
a ready reference guide for those who 
are already familiar with the subject.
The Dictionnaire des marins francs- 
maçons identifies a little-known connec-
tion between mariners and Freemason-
ry. The work was originally published in 
2008; the 2011 edition has added more 
than two thousand names that range 
from prominent French admirals such 
as Suffren, d’estaing, and raoul Castex 
to the British explorers Captain James 
Cook and ernest Shackleton; Admirals 
rodney, Nelson, Beresford, Jellicoe, 
and Fraser; such germans as Admiral 
von Tirpitz and Count von luckner; 
prominent early American naval officers 
like Abraham Whipple, John Paul Jones, 
John Barry, Stephen decatur, William 
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Bainbridge, oliver Hazard Perry, and 
matthew Perry; and later admirals of 
the U.S. Navy, including Winfield Scott 
Schley, Henry mayo, ernest J. King, 
Harris laning, and recent chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 
William J. Crowe, along with a host of 
other naval officers and mariners of all 
types. The entries for each person tend 
to be very short, sometimes only a line 
with the name of the masonic lodge 
with which that person was associated. 
In other cases, such as King george vI 
and President Franklin d. roosevelt, 
there are twenty- and thirty-line entries 
on the individuals’ lives and masonic 
connections. Some entries have dates 
of birth and death, others do not. 
The alphabetical listing of individuals is 
complemented by two short appendices. 
The first is devoted to a listing of promi-
nent naval officers in the twentieth cen-
tury who opposed Freemasonry, such as 
French admirals darlan and Platon, the 
Austrian Horthy, and the german admi-
ral von rosenberg. The second appendix 
lists the masonic lodges active in 2010 
that were originally founded by people 
with professional maritime connections, 
including one in France, seventy-one 
in the United Kingdom, twelve in the 
United States, and one each in Austra-
lia, the Philippines, and Cuba. Those in 
the United States include naval lodges 
established in the Washington Navy Yard 
in 1805 and at mare Island, California, 
in 1855, as well as the mariner’s lodge 
of New York, established in 1825. The 
alphabetical listing of individuals also 
includes short histories of “Naval lodge 
no. 4, Washington, d.C.,” and “Naval 
lodge no. 2612, london.” The masonic 
maritime research lodge in France, un-
der the direction of Jean-marc van Hille, 
continues its pioneering research for 
this reference work, aiming for complete 
worldwide coverage. An updated digital 
edition is reportedly in planning. 
JoHN B. HATTeNdorF
Naval War College
Converse, elliott v. History of Acquisition in 
the Department of Defense. vol. 1, Rearming for 
the Cold War, 1945–1960. Washington, d.C.: 
Historical office of the Secretary of defense, 
2012. Available at history.defense.gov/resources/ 
oSdHo-Acquisition-Series-vol1.pdf. 784pp.
It is immediately obvious that the effort 
put into this work was monumental. The 
foreword by dr. J. ronald Fox states that 
“management of defense acquisition has 
slowly improved, but not without painful 
periods of recreating and re-experiencing  
acquisition management problems of the 
past. . . . It is my belief that the painful 
periods have resulted to a significant 
degree from the absence of a compre-
hensive history of defense acquisition or 
even a formal record of lessons learned.” 
The initial volume covers the twists and 
turns of the politics of the post–World 
War II transition from total war to a 
situation where a single, powerful ad-
versary possessed the very same weapon 
that had ended the earlier conflict. The 
newly conceived defense department 
was required to oversee this problem. 
Technology was accelerating across the 
entire spectrum in the 1950s. The newly 
constituted U.S. Air Force first fought in 
the Korean War with the short-legged 
lockheed P-80 Shooting Star and ended 
up with the North American F-86 and 
the “century series” of operational 
fighters from the F-100 to the F-106. 
The Navy started out with the grum-
man F8F Bearcat and ended up with 
the F8U Crusader, which set a record in 
1956 at one thousand miles per hour. 
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The multiple external, real-world 
steering currents must be placed in 
historical context. There is no question 
that during the early 1950s, following 
the Soviets’ demonstration of nuclear-
weapons capability in August 1949, the 
U.S. Navy had to fight for a place at the 
table. This situation was exacerbated 
when louis A. Johnson, the second 
defense secretary (28 march 1949 to 19 
September 1950), canceled the construc-
tion of the carrier United States in what 
was for a very short time a period of 
untimely total-defense-budget reduc-
tions. It was to be British and U.S. 
carriers that provided air support for the 
ever-shrinking Korean “Pusan Pocket.” 
The relevance of these comments ties to 
the defense department’s acquisition 
and the troubled development and op-
erational life of the Navy’s North Ameri-
can AJ nuclear bomber. World War II 
ace Jimmy Flatley called this period “the 
bad old days.” It was a time when the na-
val aviation accident rate peaked for all 
high-performance aircraft. The Crusad-
er was among the worst. The problems 
of the AJ were well known. The era, 
with all that was happening in military 
aviation, including aircraft like the 
B-58, should be viewed in this context.
The B-58 discussion covers the twists 
and turns of the contract, tracing an 
amazing technical achievement that 
pressed all sides of the engineering 
envelope from the coke-bottle fuselage 
to the requirement for navigation and 
ordnance delivery at supersonic speeds. 
This section of the book provides 
insights into and lessons in govern-
ment and contractor interactions, 
many of which remain valid today. 
The similarity will become evident 
in the next volume when the Total 
Package Procurement Concept will be 
covered in the lockheed C-5 chapter
—an example of dr. Fox’s continuing 
reoccurrence of acquisition concepts.
The two major successes of acquisi-
tion in the 1950s were the Atlas and 
Polaris ballistic-missile programs. 
general Bernard A. Schriever managed 
the Air Force program, and Admiral 
“red” raborn led Polaris development. 
“Years later, [the former CNo Admiral 
Arleigh] Burke told interviewers that 
the officer he wanted ‘didn’t have to be 
a technical man. He had to be able to 
know what technical men were talking 
about. He had to get a lot of different 
kinds of people to work [together].’” 
The Soviets tested a hydrogen bomb in 
1955 and launched Sputniks 1 and 2 in 
october and November 1957, respec-
tively. In September 1961 the Atlas d 
was operational, and in mid-November 
1960, shortly after Kennedy’s election, 
USS George Washington (SSBN 598) 
departed Charleston, South Carolina, 
on an operational patrol with sixteen 
nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles. 
How did this happen?
What remains clear in the text are that 
both Schriever and raborn were given 
carte blanche and direct access to their 
service heads, as well as to whoever 
could provide assistance in industry 
and academia. A review of Air Force 
and Navy aircraft development high-
lights that the two services were literally 
stumbling through technology advances 
in aero and engine developments and 
systems. The 1950s produced aircraft 
that continued (in several cases into the 
1980s) to contribute—for example, the 
A-6 and F-4. And of course, the B-52, 
C-130, and KC-135 still do today.
AdmIrAl rICHArd geNTZ, USN, reT.
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